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TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET:
THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCE
By Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, trademark law has faced an important
transition as it has moved from the brick-and-mortar world onto
the Internet. Transitions can be difficult, particularly when they
occur over a short period of time. Trademark law in the brick-andmortar world developed over the course of centuries. In contrast,
the application of trademark law to Internet activity has gone from
essentially nothing to full-fledged regulatory regime in less than a
decade. But if transitions are difficult, plagued almost inevitably
by steps that seemed sensible at the time only to be revealed as
glaring missteps with the benefit of hindsight, they also represent
critical opportunities--opportunities to improve the fit between
law and the public purposes it is intended to achieve.
By the mid-1990s, trademark law, in particular, was very
much in need of just such a corrective. Although Congress had
enacted the Trademark Act of 1946, now commonly known as the
Lanham Act, largely as a codification of the narrowly-tailored, and
consumer-centric, common law of trademarks, courts over the
succeeding decades systematically ignored Congress's intent.'
Through a series of ill-considered (and sometimes, unconsidered)
decisions, courts broadened the scope of trademark protection,
both in terms of what could qualify as a trademark and how
broadly a trademark would be protected. 2 In many of these cases,
courts gave trademark owners protection judicially that trademark
owners had sought, but had been unable to obtain, from Congress.
Through these judicial decisions, trademark law became less
concerned with protecting consumers from material deception in
their purchasing decisions ("deception-based" trademark) and
increasingly concerned with ensuring trademark owners complete
control over their marks ("property-based" trademark). Even
where courts continued to point to consumer confusion as the
* McGlinchey Stafford Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Allyn Taylor and the International Trademark Association for
the invitation to present this essay at the Third Annual Learned Professors Symposium.
The author would also like to thank his research assistant, Marianne Cole, for her work on
this essay.
1.

See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999).

2. Id. at 373-416.
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supposed basis for their decisions, it was often little more than a
formalistic fiction used to justify judicial attempts to ensure
trademark owners of the "full and despotic dominion" over their
marks that Blackstone once imagined English landowners
3
possessed over their land.
As trademark law is moving increasingly to govern activity on
the Internet, as the result of both judicial and legislative action,
we confront the same question that we do in the brick-and-mortar
world: Is the purpose of trademark law to protect consumers or to
protect trademark owners? Of course, in some instances, these two
purposes work hand-in-hand. For example, with classic source
confusion, where company A uses company B's trademarks to sell
its products in a manner that leads ordinarily prudent consumers
to buy the products of company A believing they were made by
company B, an injunction both protects consumers from confusion
and vindicates the trademark owner's legitimate interests in its
marks. In recognition of this overlapping interest, Congress
specifically indicated in the legislative history of the Trademark
Act that the purpose of trademark law is to protect both consumers
4
and trademark owners.
Unfortunately, the interests of consumers and trademark
owners do not always coincide so neatly. While both trademark
owners and consumers share an interest in preventing material
consumer confusion as to source, their interests sharply diverge
when it comes to other types of confusion and the issue of
competition. Trademark owners oppose competition generally. As a
result, if an unauthorized use creates confusion of any kind,
whether material or immaterial to consumer purchasing decisions,
trademark owners will seize upon it and use it as an excuse to shut
down an unauthorized use, without regard to the offsetting
benefits, such as increased competition, the use may create.
Consumers, on the other hand, are intensely interested in
competition and the lower prices it can bring. In situations where
another's unauthorized use of a trademark both increases

3. For one of the worst offenders in this regard, see Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (recognizing a property
right to make and sell emblems that duplicate recognized trademarks even in the absence of
trademark confusion, on the grounds that the trademark owner created the value of the
trademark), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
4. The Senate Report accompanying the enactment of the Trademark Act defined the
purposes of the Act as follows:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product
which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
in his investment from its misappropriation.
S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274.
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competition and creates confusion, consumers will balance the
benefits of increased competition against the costs of increased
confusion to determine where their interests lie. In many cases,
particularly where the confusion is unlikely to materially influence
consumer purchasing decisions, consumers may favor increased
competition even if it results in some increased confusion.
In these instances where the interests of trademark owners
and consumers conflict, both the Trademark Act, and the common
law of trademarks on which it was based, incorporated a variety of
doctrines, such as genericness and a narrowly-tailored
infringement analysis, that favored consumers over trademark
owners and attempted to limit the anticompetitive potential of
trademark law. In the last thirty years of the 20th century,
however, courts rewrote many of these doctrines. In almost every
instance, these judicial revisions favored trademark owners-in
some cases, protecting trademarks where there was no real
consumer interest to protect, and in others, at the direct expense of
consumers. By making it easier to obtain trademark protection for
things such as trade dress, 5 by making it more difficult to establish
a claimed mark's genericness or functionality, and by making it
easier to demonstrate infringement,7 courts systematically rewrote
trademark law to favor the interests of trademark owners over
those of consumers, while paradoxically pretending that expanded
trademark protection was to benefit consumers-the very people it
was hurting the most.
Cases concerning the application of trademark law to the
Internet first reached the courts in the mid-1990s, just as this
judicial zeal to overprotect trademarks reached a peak. If one were
hoping for a carefully reasoned and measured application of
trademark law to the Internet, it did not help that these early
cases arose against a background of a lawless, almost frontier-like
mentality to Internet domain names. In the early 1990s, the
domain name registry service, Network Solutions, Inc., or
InterNIC, registered domain names on a first-come-first-served
basis, requiring initially no, and then only a token, fee for
registration. With businesses generally being slow to recognize the
commercial potential of the net, entrepreneurs (or thieves,

5. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothers: Why Trade
Dress Does Not Belong on the PrincipalRegister, 51 Hastings L.J. 1131 (2000) (recounting
how the USPTO and the courts came to recognize protection for trade dress under the
Trademark Act even though Congress specifically relegated trade dress to the supplemental
register).
6. See In re Norton Morwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338-42 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(holding that functionality in fact is insufficient to establish legal functionality sufficient to
deny trade dress trademark protection).
7.

See Lunney, supranote 1, at 391-410.
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depending on whom you asked) rushed in to register well-known
trademarks as domain names with the idea of selling them to the
highest bidder. Initially, the price to a trademark owner for
purchasing the corresponding domain name from the initial
registrant was little more than token, an acknowledgement, as it
were, of the registrant's cleverness. But by 1994, prices had
started to escalate, and trademark owners turned to the courts to
obtain by judicial decree what they thought they already owned
and hence should not have had to purchase in the marketplace.
Thus began the first period of judicial application of trademark law
to the Internet.
During this first period, courts approached the Internet as the
lawless, frontier town it largely was, and acted as if they were the
proverbial new sheriffs in town. Determined to bring justice, if
only a very rough justice, to a lawless place, and faced with a host
of bad actors who had registered domain names and were
otherwise using other's trademarks with no real justification,
courts had little time for the doctrinal niceties of trademark law.
Faced with a situation where almost every unauthorized use of
another's trademark on the Internet was illegitimate, at least in
the view of the judiciary, courts quickly determined that
trademark law should prohibit essentially every unauthorized use
of another's trademark on the Internet. If achieving that result
required imaginatively rewriting or willfully ignoring the statutory
elements found in the Trademark Act, then the courts were up to
the task. As if they were Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland,
even seemingly easily understood words, such as "use," "in
connection with the sale of goods or services," and "fame," came to
mean just what courts chose them to mean, "neither more nor
less."
Indeed, courts were so effective at their reconstruction task
that, by the time Congress and the domain name registries got
around to addressing the cybersquatting issue specifically in 1999,
Congress with the enactment of the so-called Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), and ICANN 8 with the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP), the problems these
provisions were meant to address were already largely resolved by
the courts' imaginative rewriting of trademark's general
infringement provisions and the doctrine of dilution. 9 Rather than
8. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is a nonprofit corporation created in 1998 to oversee the process of assigning domain names.
9. For a trademark owner seeking to obtain the corresponding domain name, the
UDRP did provide a lower cost alternative to trademark litigation, and it also gave the
trademark owner considerable leeway to pick a favorably-disposed arbitrator. See, e.g., A.
Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"--Causes and Partial
Cures, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 605, 709-12 (2002) (discussing pro-complainant bias introduced
into domain name resolution proceedings by UIDRP's approach to arbitrator selection).

Vol. 97 TMR

935

providing meaningful relief for an ongoing problem, these
provisions, the ACPA, particularly, became testaments to the
colorful, early years of the Internet.
By the turn of the millennium, the Internet's frontier days
were past, not so much because of the judiciary's role in rewriting
trademark law, but because businesses generally had begun to
recognize and take advantage of the Internet's commercial
potential. As established and legitimate businesses flocked to the
Internet, the nature of the trademark disputes quickly changed.
Instead of bad actors, with little or no justification, beyond mere
profit-seeking, for their registration or use of another's trademark,
Internet trademark defendants now typically had some legitimate,
good faith basis for their behavior. Two brick-and-mortar
businesses, with similar or identical trademarks, that had
coexisted peacefully for years in the real world because they
offered different products or remained geographically separated,
discovered that only one of them could own the corresponding
domain name. Companies began using other's trademarks on the
Internet, not so much to trick or deceive consumers, as to inform
them that they offered competing or complementary goods or
services. "Gripe" sites arose to provide a forum for customers,
employees or others to criticize a trademark owner. The sites
would often use the trademark as a domain name, or part of it, in
order to attract consumers to the site. While we might weigh the
consumer interest and informational role of the defendant's actions
in each of these cases differently, each of the defendants in these
cases has more than a merely colorable, good faith basis for its
unauthorized use of another's mark. Whether we decide at the end
of the day to permit or deny any of these uses under trademark
law, none of these is the cybersquatting extortion of the Internet's
frontier days.
As these good faith defendants began to appear, some courts
were slow to recognize the fundamental shift that was occurring.
In cases such as Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp.,10 these unperceptive courts continued to
believe that every Internet use of a trademark could be readily
classified as black or white, with little need to sort through shades
of gray, and so continued to rewrite the rules of trademark law
accordingly. Thus, the initial interest confusion doctrine, in its
radically overbroad Internet form, was born.'1 In other cases, such
as Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles' 2 and Playboy Enterprises,

10.

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).

11.
12.

See Broofield Comms., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062-65.
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,13 more perceptive courts
recognized the shift more quickly, and began to re-introduce into
trademark law, through the fair use, nominative fair use, and
other doctrines, the subtleties that would permit the court to sort
through the competing interests implicated by a given use of a
trademark.
As this shift in the nature of Internet trademark defendants
picked up steam, the United States Supreme Court re-entered the
picture. Although it did not jump into the Internet trademark
disputes directly, through a series of decisions beginning with WalMart Stores v. Samara Brothers, 4 the Court emphasized the
consumer-centric, deception-based justifications for trademark
law, and repudiated the broader, property-based vision of
trademarks. Trademarks are supposed to promote competition, not
inhibit it, the Supreme Court seemed to say, and we need to be
careful as we craft trademark's legal doctrines to keep that
foremost in our minds.
In the last five years, as courts have attempted to implement
the Supreme Court's vision of consumer-centric, deception-based
trademark law on the Internet, they have been forced to confront
their own decisions from the Internet's frontier era. Having just rewritten the rules to make every decision, black-or-white, easy in
order to control the rampant lawlessness of the Internet's early
days, stare decisis made re-writing the rules yet again a somewhat
tricky proposition. Congress could step in and address each
doctrinal issue by statutory amendment, and at least with respect
to one issue, has already done so. 15 But given Congress's inability
to enact the ACPA in a timely fashion, more than this, we cannot
realistically expect. Instead, what we have seen over the last five
years are logical contortions and legal sophistry of the highest
order as courts struggle to re-write the rules, yet again, in order to
vindicate good actors from the law that the courts created to catch
the bad actors of the Internet's frontier era.
As a result of these re-revisions, what we are left with right
now is a muddle. In some cases, courts have resorted to judicial
hair-splitting in order to distinguish the facts of two cases.' 6 This

13.

354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).

14. 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (requiring proof of secondary meaning before product design
trade dress could receive protection). This decision was followed by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418
(2003); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004).
15. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra (discussing how courts watered down the
fame requirement for dilution protection under Section 43(c) in the Internet's frontier era
and Congress's subsequent 2006 amendments intended to restore the fame requirement).
16.

See text accompanying notes 125-28, infra.
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approach may vindicate a particular defendant in a particular case
without question. Yet, such an approach ill-serves the public notice
and law-making functions of judicial opinions. If a given use
constitutes trademark use in some cases, but not others, or if
momentarily misdirecting consumers from one website to another
establishes actionable trademark infringement in some cases, but
not others, consumers, competitors, and trademark owners can
never be certain, unless they litigate the issue, whether or not a
given use will prove actionable under trademark law. In other
cases, courts have given an overly narrow interpretation to one
legal rule in an attempt to counteract an earlier, overly broad
interpretation of a different rule. For example, the unauthorized
use of another's trademark to trigger the display of advertisements
would almost certainly create actionable confusion under the
overly broad initial interest confusion doctrine adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications, Inc. To avoid that
doctrine, the Second Circuit held that such an advertising use does
not constitute "trademark use," and was therefore non-infringing,
whether confusing or not. Again, such an approach may vindicate
the conduct of a particular defendant, but in addition to other
difficulties, is poorly tailored to protecting the relevant consumer
interests at stake. Some keyword-triggered ads can materially
confuse consumers, leading them to buy from company A believing
they are buying from company B, while other triggered ads do not.
Ideally, under trademark law, the first and only the first type of ad
should be prohibited. Yet, the Second Circuit's interpretation of
"trademark use" does not attempt to distinguish between the two
types of ads, but in an effort to avoid the overbroad reach of the
initial interest confusion doctrine, excuses them both.
To move forward, past this confusing and often conflicting
array of competing doctrinal elements, courts should re-focus on
what trademark law is supposed to protect. If the purpose of
trademark law is to enrich trademark owners, then let us just say
so and the law can develop from there, at least until Congress or
the Supreme Court steps in. If, on the other hand, the purpose of
trademark law is to enable consumers to match their desires to
specific goods in the marketplace, then courts should try to
articulate in each case the competing informational roles a
defendant's use of a mark may serve. Having identified these
competing roles, a court can then explain how they should be
balanced to best advance consumer welfare. No doubt, not every
court will balance these interests identically, but by identifying the
competing interests at stake, rather than hiding behind vague
catchphrases, we can at least see what is being balanced and how.
Such clarity would help us tailor trademark law more closely to
the public policies it is supposed to serve, and should also enable
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individuals to predict with more confidence whether any given
course of conduct will run afoul of trademark law.
In order to explore these issues more fully, this article is
divided into three sections: (II) The past; (III) The Present; and
(IV) The Future. Part II will focus on the early judicial decisions
applying trademark law to the Internet. It will examine the
Internet's frontier period, discuss some of the early cases and their
fact patterns, and attempt to show how the courts re-wrote various
doctrinal elements of trademark law so they could reach the bad
actors before them. While this period is characterized more by the
predominantly bad faith nature of the defendants than by a
calendar, it runs for approximately five years, from the first
judicial application of trademark law to the Internet in 1996 until
just past the turn of the millennium. From there, we transition to
the present, where we examine the shift from bad faith defendants
to good faith defendants, and analyze how courts responded. Part
III will discuss how the get-the-bad-actor mindset that the
judiciary developed in the Internet's frontier era lingered, at least
for some courts, a bit too long, and then lay out some of the
distinctions and doctrinal revisions the courts have used in an
attempt to rein in the potentially overbroad reach of the Internet's
frontier era trademark law. Again, the period is defined more by
the predominantly good faith nature of the defendants than by a
calendar, but runs, more or less, from 2001 through the present.
Finally, Part IV will conclude with some thoughts on where we
should go from here.
II. THE PAST: BAD ACTORS MAKE BAD LAW
The growth of the Internet as a commercial medium can be
traced to two developments in 1993. First, on April 30, 1993, the
European Organization for Nuclear Research, commonly known as
CERN, dedicated the software behind the World Wide Web to the
public, making it available for anyone to use on a royalty-free
basis. 17 Second, Mark Andreeson's team at the University of
Illinois introduced Mosaic, a graphical browser for the Internet.
Together, these two developments facilitated the development of
web pages with text and integrated graphics, opening the Internet
to ordinary users. With the release of Netscape Navigator in 1994,
the Internet's future as a new venue for commerce was becoming
clear.
Nonetheless, while some companies had registered their
domain names before the World Wide Web, for example, MIT in

17. See http://tenyearswww.web.cern.chltenyearswww/Welcome.html
Apr. 17, 2007).

(last

visited
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1985 and IBM in 1986,18 other companies were slower to act. By
May 1994, only one-third of Fortune 500 companies had registered
their company names as domain names. 19 Moreover, under
InterNIC's registration policy in effect from April 1993 until July
1995, domain names were registered on a first come-first served
basis. As a result, by May 1994, 14 percent
of the Fortune 500 had
20
their names registered by someone else.
Against this background, it did not take long for the first
lawsuits to arise. The first three were, except perhaps for the
parties directly involved, more amusing than anything else. In
MTV v. Curry,21 one of MTV's VJs (video jockey-a play on the
traditional radio designation DJ for disk jockey) Adam Curry had
registered the domain name mtv.com and set up a related
website-allegedly with MTV's consent and encouragement. When
MTV and Curry parted ways, on not so amicable terms, Curry
would not turn the site over to MTV, and so MTV sued. In another
instance, Princeton Review registered kaplan.com-the domain
name corresponding to its chief competitor. 22 Upon arrival at the
site, users were immediately informed that they had reached
Princeton Review and asked to contribute to a list of complaints
about Kaplan Education Centers. Although Princeton Review
claimed to have registered the domain name "as a playful prank"
and offered to transfer the domain name to Kaplan for a case of
beer, 23 Kaplan sued instead, unwilling to acknowledge its rival's
cleverness. In the third case, a writer, Joshua Quittner, registered
mcdonalds.com to illustrate his point that some well-known
businesses were slow to recognize the commercial potential of the
Internet. 24 Quittner offered to transfer the domain name to
McDonalds if it would pay to provide high-speed Internet access
for P.S. 308, a public school in New York. 25 All three cases were
eventually resolved without a final judicial resolution, two of them
by settlement, and the dispute over kaplan.com by arbitration.
18. Carl Oppedahl, Half a Century of Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act
Turns Fifty: Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute
Policy, 7 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 73, 74 (1996).
19. See Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, Wired, Oct. 1994, at 50 (available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2. 10/mcdonalds-pr.html) (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
20. Id.
21. 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting MTV's motion for a more definite
statement with respect to Curry's unfair competition counterclaim).
22. See, e.g., Stewart Ugelow, Address for Success: Internet Name Game, Wash. Post,
Aug. 11, 1994, at Al, A20.
23. The PrincetonReview Relinquishes Controversial Name; Kaplan.com Finds a New
Home, PR Newswire, Oct. 5, 1994.
24. See Quittner, supra note 19.
25. See Joshua Quittner, Computers in the 90s; Awaiting word on mcdonalds.com,
Newsday, Nov. 1, 1994, at B31.
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Yet, even if they did not contribute to the making of Internet
trademark law through the common law adjudicative process,
these disputes represented the first trickle of an impending wave
of Internet trademark lawsuits. Moreover, before eventually
settling with Quittner, McDonalds sent a threatening letter to
Network Solutions, raising the question whether Network
Solutions was legally liable for its domain name registration
practices. In a subsequent lawsuit, Knowledgenet named Network
Solutions as a co-defendant when Knowledgenet sued David Boone
in federal court in Illinois for allegedly registering its business
26
name and federally registered trademark as a domain name.
Other lawsuits naming Network Solutions as a defendant soon
27
followed.
In an attempt to extricate itself from these lawsuits, Network
Solutions announced a new domain name policy on July 23, 1995.
Until that point, Network Solutions's policy on trademark disputes
had complied with RFC 1591.28 One of a series of consensus-based
documents that had established the governing framework for the
Internet, RFC 1591, entitled Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation, set forth a simple role for the domain name
registration authority: "In case of a dispute between domain name
registrants as to the rights to a particular name, the registration
authority shall have no role or responsibility other than to provide
the contact information to both parties."29 In its 1995 domain
policy, Network Solutions left behind this position of neutrality
and agreed to take a more active role in policing potential
trademark infringement on the Internet.
The 1995 policy took two principal steps attempting to address
the registration of others' trademarks as domain names. First, it
required each domain name applicant to warrant that its use of
the proposed domain name "does not interfere with or infringe the
right of any third party in any jurisdiction with respect to
trademark, service mark, tradename, company name or any other
intellectual property right. '30 Second, it provided trademark

26. See
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Knowledgenet-v_InterNIC_et_al/KnowlegeNet.
complaint (First Amended Complaint, last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
27. See, e.g., Jessica R. Friedman, Report: A Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information
Superhighway: Trademark, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 730, 735 (1995) (noting that InterNIC was
also named as a defendant in Fry's Electronics's lawsuit attempt to wrest control of the
domain name frys.com from a Seattle catering company).
28. An "RFC" is a "request for comment." Taken together, these RFCs represented
consensus-based technical standards governing the operation of the Internet.
29. RFC 1591, Mar. 1994, (available at http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1591.html) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
30. NSI Domain Name Resolution Policy, July 2005, at 1(c) (available at http://
www.eff.org/Spam-cybersquatting-abuse/Cybersquatting/9507-internic-domain.poicy) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
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owners, and those who believed they were trademark owners, with
an easy and cost-effective method of deactivating an allegedly
infringing domain name. Specifically, a trademark owner needed
only to send Network Solutions a letter stating that another's
domain name was its registered trademark. 31 Network Solutions
would then give the current holder of the domain name 30 days to
produce its own trademark registration or Network Solutions
would place the domain name on hold. 32 Once placed on hold, a
domain name was essentially deactivated, and users could no
longer find the registrant's web pages at that address.
To prevent the hold, the domain name holder had to produce
its own corresponding trademark registration. Curiously, under
the July 1995 policy, the date of the domain name holder's
trademark registration was immaterial. Thus, upon receiving the
thirty-day letter, a domain name holder could rush out and obtain
a trademark registration from the one country that would process
a trademark application within thirty days-Tunisia-and use
that registration to stave off deactivation of the domain name.
Several domain name holders did so. 33 But Network Solutions
eliminated this option with its September 1996 policy. Under the
September 1996 policy, Network Solutions would halt the thirtyday hold process only if the domain name holder submitted a
trademark registration obtained before the thirty-day process
34
began.
For a country, such as the United States, where trademark
35
rights are founded, even today, on use, rather than registration,
the policy's preoccupation with the registration of a trademark,
rather than its legal existence, presented obvious problems. The
intent, at least in part, was to replace somewhat fact-intensive
priority disputes based upon who actually used a mark first with a

31. This was changed effective September 9, 1996, to require a certified copy of the
trademark registration. See Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy, Sept. 9, 1996,
at 5(c) (available at http://www.eff.org/Spam-cybersquatting.abuse/Cybersquatting/9609internic-domain.policy) (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
32. NSI Domain Name Resolution Policy, July 23, 2005, at 6(a) (available at http:/
www.eff.org/Spamcybersquatting-abuse/Cybersquatting/9507_internic-domain.policy) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
33.

See Oppedahl, supra note 18, at 91-92.

34. NSI Domain Name Resolution Policy, Sept. 9, 1996, at 6(c) (available at http://
www.eff.org/Spam-cybersquatting_-abuse/Cybersquatting/9609_internic-domain.policy) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
35. While registration of a trademark offers certain advantages, such as nationwide
priority, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c), 1072, and a presumption of validity and ownership, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1057(b), 1115(a), registration has never been required in the United States for trademark
protection. However, aside from registration under the Madrid Protocol, 15 U.S.C. § 1141,
use remains a prerequisite for registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), (c), (d) (setting forth
requirements for use-based registration application and for alleging use for intent-to-usebased registration application).

942

Vol. 97 TMR

simpler black-and-white rule based on registration dates. The
policy also shifted outcomes in favor of larger, national and
international trademark owners, who more typically had already
registered their marks, at the expense of smaller, local and
regional players, who more typically had not. Once the September
1996 policy eliminated the Tunisia option, for a domain name
holder, whose trademark rights happened to be based upon actual
use, rather than registration, the only way to stave off deactivation
was to sue Network Solutions. Between March and November
1996, seven domain name holders who had received thirty-day
letters did so; all successfully. 36 But if a party could not afford
litigation with Network Solutions, the early domain name policies
invariably proved fatal to a domain name holder whose
corresponding trademark rights were based upon use, rather than
registration.
In addition to ignoring trademark rights based upon use,
rather than registration, the early domain name policies also had a
serious flaw from the perspective of a trademark owner whose
corresponding domain name had been registered by a bad faith
cybersquatter. While such a trademark owner could use the
policies to have Network Solutions deactivate the domain name
and thus stop any infringement, the early policies did not force a
transfer of the domain name to the trademark owner. To obtain a
transfer, the trademark owner had to obtain a court order or
negotiate a consensual transfer of the domain name with the
cybersquatter-a transfer whose terms would presumably depend
on the likelihood and expense of obtaining the court order.
Network Solutions' early domain name policies thus allowed
trademark owners to stop infringing uses, and probably some uses
that were not in fact infringing, but to obtain the domain name for
themselves, trademark owners had little choice but to go to court.
At the outset, however, any such lawsuit faced seemingly
insurmountable legal hurdles. Until Congress enacted the ACPA
in 1999 to address cybersquatters specifically, trademark owners
had to pursue cybersquatters and other illegitimate domain name
registrants under the general principles of trademark law or
dilution. Neither was tailored to address these issues, and both
required a plaintiff to establish elements that typically would not
be present in the usual case of cybersquatting.

36. See Roadrunner v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 413A (E.D. Va. dismissed
June 21, 1996); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 429 (M.D. Tenn.
filed May 8, 1996); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 20434 (N.D. Cal. filed
May 30, 1996); Clue v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 694-5 (D. Colo. filed June 13,
1996); Dynamic Info. System v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 1551 (D. Colo. filed
June 24, 1996); Regis v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 20551 (N.D. Cal. filed July 9,
1996); Juno Online v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-1505-A (E.D. Va. dismissed Oct. 25,
1996); see also Oppedahl, supra note 18, at 89-91.
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Under trademark law generally, the paradigm case of
infringement occurred when company A used company B's
trademark, or a mark confusingly similar, in a way that would
persuade consumers to purchase the products or services of
company A mistakenly believing they had come from company B.
Congress had specifically drafted the trademark infringement
standard with this paradigm case in mind. As a result, Section
1114 defined trademark infringement as the: (1) "use" of (2) a
"copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark" (3) "in connection
with the sale ... of any goods or services" (4) "which ...is likely to
cause confusion." 37 While a cybersquatter's bad faith registration of
another's trademark as a domain name might have easily satisfied
the second element, mere registration alone would not qualify as
trademark use under the first element. Similarly, where the
cybersquatter was not offering any goods or services at the
relevant domain name, it was also difficult to see how the
cybersquatter would lead consumers to purchase anything, let
alone persuade them to purchase the goods of company A believing
they came from company B, as required by the third and fourth
elements.
Dilution, whether pursued as a state law claim or under the
newly enacted (at the time) Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 (FTDA),3 8 offered a potentially more viable avenue for
challenging cybersquatters, though like the general trademark
infringement standard, dilution also required proof of the
defendant's use of the mark. 39 Although the author must confess to
37. Section 32(1)(a) of the Trademark Act sets forth the general infringement standard
for registered trademarks as follows:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2007).
38. Pub. L. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Stat. 985 (1996), codified, as amended,
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), 1127.
39. Section 43(c), as amended in 2006, contains the federal prohibition on dilution and
provides:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction
against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous,
commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence
or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2007).
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never really understanding what it is that dilution is supposed to
address, 40 the FTDA defines dilution as another's subsequent,
unauthorized use of an identical or similar mark that lessens the
initial mark's distinctive quality. 41 This lessening, known as
"blurring," somehow occurs when another party uses an identical
or nearly-identical mark on unrelated goods, even where there is
no likelihood of consumer confusion. If this blurring is allowed to
continue, the argument goes, then soon the selling power of the
mark will be whittled away to nothing. 42 While this is perfectly
fine as a theory of how things might work, as far as the author is
aware, no one has identified even a single instance where this
whittling away to nothing has actually occurred. Even the
legislative history accompanying the FTDA could cite only
hypothetical cases. 43 Nonetheless, even if we suppose, as Congress
has, that dilution represents a real-world phenomenon, there
remained a fundamental stumbling block to applying it to
instances of cybersquatting generally. At least under federal law,
dilution only applies to famous marks. 4 4 The vast majority of
marks do not qualify.
Yet, even if their legal claims were weak, trademark owners
had something else going for them-they had a sympathetic claim.
They had spent, in some cases, millions of dollars popularizing
their brands; the brands were their property, or so trademark
owners believed; and the behavior of the cybersquatters was
unseemly, striking most as an extortionate attempt to hold-up
trademark owners. So trademark owners took their relatively
weak, but extremely sympathetic legal claims to court, and hoped

40. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 40810 (noting that whatever dilution was supposed to
address when first proposed in 1927 has been more than adequately addressed by
subsequent expansion in trademark's general infringement standard).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("The term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services....").
42. See, e.g., Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2006);
see also 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:71
(4th ed. 2006) (discussing the underlying rationale of the dilution cause of action, which is to
protect "the senior user's property right and good will in his mark" from the "gradual
diminution or whittling away of the value of [his] trademark, resulting from use by
another").
43. H.R. Rep. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1029, 1030 (offering hypothetical examples of dilution by stating that "the use
of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under this
legislation'); see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)
(offering additional hypothetical examples of 'Tylenol snowboards, Netscape sex shops and
Harry Potter dry cleaners"). Is just one real-world example too much to ask?
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2007) (recognizing a cause of action for dilution by blurring
or tarnishment for "the owner of a famous mark"); see also Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1999); IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163
F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998).
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that the folklore about bad facts making bad law would hold true.
For the most part, it did. With respect to the use requirement
found both in the general trademark infringement section and in
the dilution section, courts acknowledged that "registration of a
trademark as a domain name, without more" did not constitute
trademark use. 45 But, registration of a domain name with the
intent to resell it did. 46 It is difficult to see how this interpretation
of use makes any sense. Although the author has broken "use" out
as a separate element, the statute is more organic, tying use
directly to the creation of confusion or dilution. Yet, if it is the
resale of the domain name that counts as use, it is not a use that
can possibly create confusion. The only corresponding product for
sale is the domain name itself. Presumably, when a trademark
owner is negotiating with a cybersquatter to purchase a domain
name, it knows that it is not purchasing the domain name from
itself and is thus not confused. To avoid this result, courts focused
on one type of conduct, the intent to resell, to satisfy the use
element, and then turned to other conduct, such as the registration
of an identical domain name, to resolve the likelihood of confusion
or dilution issues. Thus, the use hurdle to reaching cybersquatters
through the general trademark infringement standard or dilution
was cleared, and cleared in a way that opened the door to dilution
and infringement claims generally.
Alternatively, if the domain name holder was not simply
sitting on the domain name, hoping to resell it, but was actively
maintaining a website at the address, then use was clear and often
the key question was whether the defendant's use was
"commercial" under the dilution provision or "in connection with
the sale ... of any goods or services" under the general trademark
infringement standard. This issue arose in a series of cases where
individuals registered an organization's trademark as a domain
name and then set up a website at that address that criticized or
ridiculed the political, ethical, or religious message of the
trademark owner. Examples include the registration of
plannedparenthood.com, 4 7 jewsforjesus.com, 48 and peta.org 49 by

45. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
1996) ('CToeppen's
46. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill.
intention to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use
[under the federal dilution provision]."); PanavisionInt, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1303 (same).
47. Planned Parenthood v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. 1998).
48. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir.
1998).
49. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.
2001).
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defendants, who, in each case, set up a website expressing views
diametrically opposed to, or making fun of, those of the
corresponding trademark owner.
It was a little difficult to see how these websites would
persuade consumers to purchase the goods of company A believing
they came from company B, both because the sites were not selling
anything and because consumers would immediately realize the
nature of these sites upon reaching them. Yet, courts had little
trouble finding a way to rewrite trademark law to reach this
conduct. As the district court in the Planned Parenthood case
explained:
[D]efendant has appropriated plaintiffs mark in order to
reach an audience of Internet users who want to reach
plaintiffs services and viewpoint, intercepting them and
misleading them in an attempt to offer his own political
message....

[D]efendant's appropriation not only provides

Internet users with competing and directly opposing
information, but also prevents those users from reaching
plaintiff and its services and message. 50
As for whether these defendants' uses would create more than
momentary confusion, as users simply returned to their searches
in order to find the organization's real website, courts simply
speculated that that might not happen. As the district court
explained in the PETA case, "The prospective users of [PETA's]
services who mistakenly access Defendant's web site may fail to
continue to search for [PETA's] own home page, due to anger,
frustration, or the belief that [PETA's] home page does not exist."51
Of course, there was no evidence that the defendants' websites in
any of these cases actually prevented anyone from finding the
plaintiffs' real websites. Moreover, the supposition that users
would give up, rather than hit the back button, seems implausible
given the state of search engines on the Internet at that time and
the almost invariable need to try a number of sites before finding
the right one.
Rather than continue to assert factually implausible
propositions, courts applying trademark law soon decided simply
to abandon any requirement that confusion play any material role
in consumer purchasing decisions. Under the initial interest
confusion doctrine adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield

50. Planned Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435; see also People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 365 (following Planned Parenthood's approach); OBH,
Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (same) ; Jews for
Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308 (same).
51. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919
(E.D. Va. 2000).
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Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,52 it is
enough that a consumer was momentarily misdirected. Somewhat
surprisingly, this radical expansion in the scope of trademark
infringement did not occur in a case with a bald-faced, bad faith
defendant. Rather, the Ninth Circuit crafted this vast expansion in
the scope of trademark infringement in a case involving the
allocation of a domain name between two parties, both with good
faith claims to it. In its brick-and-mortar operations, West Coast
had used the term "The Movie Buffs Movie Store," and a number
of variations of it, since 1986, as part of its video rental store
operations,
and had held a federal registration on the term since
1991. 53 Similarly, Brookfield had offered its MovieBuff database
since either December 1993 or January 1994, and had held a
federal registration for the mark since 1998. 54 While the two uses
coexisted peacefully in the real world, when both companies moved
to the Internet, both wanted the domain name moviebuff.com, but
55
only one could have it and West Coast registered it first.
Despite the problems with a first-come-first-served approach
to domain names in cases involving cybersquatters, the approach
makes considerable sense when two parties each have a good faith
basis for wanting the domain name. 56 In 1998, at the time
Brookfield sued, that seemed to be the commonly accepted practice
as well. If two companies had similar or identical names or marks,
then the first one to register the simplest version of the mark as a

52.

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).

53. Brookfield "Comms.,Inc., 174 F.3d at 1043 & n.5.
54. Id. at 1041-42 & n.1.
55. Id. at 1042.
56. The other two alternatives are, first, neither party can use the corresponding
domain name because allowing either to use the corresponding domain name would
momentarily misdirect some consumers. For example, if two company A+s are involved, if
we allow the first A+ to use the domain name, then some consumers of the second A+ will
find the site and believe that they are at the website of the second A+ . Similarly, if we allow
the second A+ to use the domain name, then some consumers of the first A+ will find the
site and believe that they are at the website of the first A+. Thus, allowing either to use the
corresponding domain name will create initial interest confusion of the sort found actionable
in Brookfield. Because each use would be infringing, neither would be permitted. Second
and alternatively, a court could try to adopt a domain name ownership rule that would favor
the party whose use would create less initial interest confusion, and could thus award the
domain name to the A+ that was more famous or familiar to consumers, or whose
trademark or tradename was closer to the exact form of the domain name. Perhaps such an
approach would be justified where there was a wide difference between the likely confusion
that assigning the domain name to one or the other mark owner would create, such as for
example, assigning www.mcdonalds.com to the restaurant chain, rather than a relatively
unknown company named McDonalds Nurseries. But such an approach is harder to justify
where the two companies competing for the mark have similar levels of consumer
recognition, and would also be inconsistent with the approach found in the reverse
confusion cases where greater consumer recognition alone does not establish trademark
rights.
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domain name got to keep it, and the other company had to make
do with some other, usually longer and hence less attractive,
variation. Brookfield, after learning that West Coast had already
registered moviebuff.com, registered both brookfieldcomm.com and
moviebuffonline.com. However, it was not ready to give up the
shorter, easier to remember moviebuff.com, and so sued West
Coast in federal district court, alleging trademark infringement
and the usual assortment of associated legal claims. The district
court denied Brookfield's request for a preliminary injunction, and
57
weeks later, West Coast launched its website at moviebuff.com.
This sent Brookfield scurrying to the Ninth Circuit with an
emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, which the
Ninth Circuit granted in February 1999, contingent on Brookfield
58
posting a nominal bond of $25,000.
Two months later, in April 1999, the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion. In it, the Ninth Circuit awarded the moviebuff.com
domain name to Brookfield, and prohibited West Coast from either
using the domain name or including the word "moviebuff" in that
portion of its website programming, known as metatags, which are
invisible to ordinary users but picked up by search engines. In
determining who was the first to use moviebuff.com and thus had
priority over the disputed mark, the Ninth Circuit retreated to a
curiously formal, hyper-technical analysis that focused on the
differences between moviebuff.com and West Coast's registered
trademark "The Movie Buffs Movie Store." 59 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the well-established commercial practice of
eliminating spaces (which cannot be used in domain names) and
shortening trademarks in order to make them more easily
remembered and easier to type when registering them as domain
names. Having awarded priority to Brookfield, the panel then
found a variety of ways in which consumers might be confused
when they reached a moviebuff.com website operated by West
Coast. 60 They might think that they had found Brookfield's
website, even though the services that the two companies were
offering were quite different; they might believe that West Coast
had licensed "MovieBuff' from Brookfield; or they might believe
that West Coast's database had replaced Brookfield's. 6 1 While
some or all of these theories might have been sufficient, if there
was any evidence to support them, the Ninth Circuit was not yet
57. Id. at 1043.
58. Id.
59. Brookfield Comms., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1047-49 (finding that West Coast could not
tack (or date) its first use of moviebuff.com onto its first use of 'The Movie Buffs Movie
Store" finding that the two do not create the same "continuing commercial impression").
60. Id. at 1057.
61.

Id.
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satisfied and so held that actionable trademark confusion resulted
"even where people realize, immediately upon accessing
'moviebuff.com,' that they have reached a site operated by West
62
Coast and wholly unrelated to Brookfield."
Such momentary misdirection, the panel held, was a
misappropriation of Brookfield's goodwill in its 'MovieBuff"
trademark, and therefore constituted actionable trademark
infringement, even if immediately dispelled. The panel took this
so-called "initial interest" confusion doctrine from its origins in just
a few cases in the brick-and-mortar world.6 3 However, there is a
key difference between these two settings. In the real world, initial
interest confusion, even if cleared up before the actual purchase of
a piano or a cargo of oil, may persist long enough that a consumer
relies on the initially false impression in beginning negotiations
towards the actual purchase. Although an economist would
suggest that such sunk costs should not affect the consumer's
behavior and that consumers should pull out of negotiations once
they learn the truth, the simple fact is that sunk costs do affect
consumers, which is no doubt just one of the ways in which real
world consumers disappoint economists. 64 As a result, these realworld initial interest confusion cases do not require confusion at
the point of purchase, because under their specific factual
circumstances, the initial interest confusion is likely to linger long
enough to influence materially consumers' ultimate purchasing
decisions. 65 Even the real-world example that the Brookfield panel
used to justify applying initial interest confusion to the Internet
recognized the importance of these sunk costs, implicitly
incorporating them into its hypothetical to make it persuasive:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster")
puts up a billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast Video:
2 miles ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located
at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers
looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive
around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing
the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may
62. Id. Curiously, when West Coast tried to turn this argument around and point out
that if Brookfield operated a site at moviebuff.com, some consumers might reach it looking
for West Coast's site, the panel took a statement by West Coast that there was no actual
confusion between the two parties in the real world and held that it found West Coast on
the Internet as well. Id. at 1050.
63. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1987); Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir.
1975).
64. Even for an economist, the sunk costs are relevant to the issue, as they identify the
likely costs that consumers will waste due to the initially misleading impression.
65. See, e.g., Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d at 1341-42.
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simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast
may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching
for
66
West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.
Whatever persuasive force this example may have, the
problem with using it to justify applying the initial interest
confusion doctrine to the Internet is that, as the panel itself
recognized, there are no similar sunk costs on the Internet. "In the
Internet context, in particular, entering a web site takes little
effort-usually one click from a linked site or a search engine's
list ... ."67 There is no reliance, no sunk cost in the Internet context
equivalent to that of pulling off a highway and driving around.
Moreover, unlike the video store hypothetical, where a consumer
may have no idea where to find the West Coast video store's real
location, on the Internet, all the consumer need do is click the
mouse a few times to get back to the search engine's listing of sites
and try another one. 68 Without the reliance on the initially false
statement and facing extremely low costs of resuming the search
for the desired goods or services, there is no reason to believe that
the statement will materially influence consumer purchasing
decisions.
Nevertheless, by rewriting the rules of trademark
infringement to incorporate such momentary misdirection, courts
made the general trademark infringement standard readily
applicable to a wide array of Internet trademark disputes. In
addition, they also rewrote and essentially eliminated the "fame"
requirement under the federal dilution provision in order to open
another avenue for reaching the bad faith defendants before them.
To be sure, at least some of the trademarks at issue in these
early cases were plausibly famous, as that term was intended in
the federal dilution provision. For example, one of the first domain
name opinions arose from Hasbro's allegations that a defendant's
use of the domain name candyland.com for a porn site diluted
Hasbro's federally registered CANDY LAND mark. 69 As an
ordinary consumer, and father of three boys who were only
recently playing Hasbro's CANDY LAND game, the author is
66. Brookfield Comms., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064 (italics added).
67. Id. at 1057.
68. See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Use of the
highway billboard metaphor is not the best analogy to a metatag on the Internet. The harm
caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is difficult to correct. In contrast, on the
information superhighway, resuming one's search for the correct website is relatively
simple. With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can return to the
search engine's results and resume searching for the original website.").
69. Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D.
Wash. 1996). Recognizing that spaces cannot be used in domain names, the court paid no
attention to the removal of the space from the plaintiffs registered CANDY LAND
trademark in the defendant's domain name.
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perfectly willing to accept the mark as famous, or at least plausibly
so. Even if it does not make Business Week's list of the Top 100
brands, many of us are familiar with the mark outside of the
lawsuit in which the dilution claim was raised. In contrast,
subsequent decisions, in order to apply dilution to the bad actors of
the Internet, have found Sporty's, Intermatic, and Panavision
famous, as well. 70 It is not just that these marks are unfamiliar
outside of the specific litigation in which they were involved, but
when a district court has to point to the fact that the 'Filmed with
Panavision' credit appears in the 'end titles' of many television
shows and movies" 71 as the best available evidence of fame, it is
hard to imagine better evidence that a mark is not famous.
Fortunately, Congress has intervened to restore some
substance to the "famous" mark limitation. In the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Congress added language to Section
43(c), specifically requiring that a mark be "widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States" before it
72
receives dilution protection.
To a large extent, the need for this judicial rewriting of the
general trademark infringement and dilution standards ended in
1999 as a result of two events. First, the domain name registries,
under the guidance of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, replaced their early domain name policies
with the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
(UDRP). Second, Congress enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), formally adding Section 43(d) to
the Trademark Act. While there are slight differences between the
UDRP and the ACPA, both were specifically tailored to address
cybersquatting. The UDRP prohibits: (i) the registration of a
confusingly similar domain name; (ii) where the registrant has no
rights or legitimate interests in the name; and (iii) registers it in
bad faith. 73 The ACPA prohibits: (i) registration, use or trafficking

70. See Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 & n.10 (9th
Cir. 2000) (noting the district court's finding that Sporty's was a famous mark, but granting
the plaintiff relief under ACPA); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303
(C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.
Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Iil. 1996).
71. PanavisionInt'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1303.
72. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 312, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2,
120 Stat. 1730 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2007).
73. Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP provides a remedy where a trademark owner can
prove that:
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service
mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii)

you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
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in a domain name that is (ii) 7confusingly
similar or dilutive with
4
(iii) a bad faith intent to profit.
While these provisions might have been tremendously helpful
had they been adopted in 1995 or 1996, by 1999, the
cybersquatting issue, at least within the United States, had largely
been resolved. In part, it had been resolved by courts' creative rewritings of trademark's likelihood of confusion and dilution
provisions. More importantly, businesses had begun to recognize
the value of the Internet as a tool for marketing, advertising, and
sales. The days when domain names corresponding to valuable
trademarks remained available for the taking were over. Instead,
by 1999, the days of trademark disputes between parties each with
some good faith basis for their use of a given domain name or
trademark on the Internet, already foreshadowed by cases such as
Brookfield, had begun.
III. THE PRESENT:
GOOD ACTORS ATTEMPTING TO AVOID BAD LAW
If the first five years of applying trademark law to the Internet
were something of a frontier era, dominated by bad actors, bad
facts, and consequently bad law, the predominant theme of the
next five years has been courts attempting to rewrite (yet again)
the very laws they had just rewritten, this time, in order to leave
more room for the unauthorized use of another's trademark on the
Internet by actors with some legitimate purpose. To be sure, not
all of these actors prevailed, nor should they have, but none of
UDRP, 4 (Aug. 26, 1999) (available at http://www.icann.orgldndrludrppohcy.htm) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
74.

Section 43(d) of the Trademark Act provides:

(d) Cyberpiracy prevention.
(1)
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person(i)

has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I)

in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;

(I)

in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to or dilutive of that mark; or

(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of
title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United
States Code.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2007).
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these actors are the bald-faced, bad faith cybersquatters of the
Internet's frontier days. In sharp contrast to the cybersquatting
cases, in this second generation of Internet trademark disputes,
there is at least some plausible argument that consumers would be
better off if the use is allowed, than if the use is prohibited. If the
purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers and minimize
their search costs, then these cases present a far closer question on
where consumers' interests lie than did the cybersquatters in
balancing the competing interests of consumers, trademark
owners, and competitors.
A. The Pendulum Starts to Swing Back
Perhaps given the nature of the Internet, it is not surprising
that the pendulum began to swing back in two cases involving
Playboy's efforts to prevent the unauthorized use of its
trademarks. In the first, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEI) sued a
defendant who had used its Playboy and Playmate trademarks
without authorization in the metatags, on the masthead, on75
banner ads, and as a watermark on the pages of her website.
Unlike earlier defendants in similar lawsuits, however, the
defendant's use here served a legitimate function because the
defendant was Terri Welles, Playboy's Playmate of the Year in
1981.76 Welles' use of the Playboy marks to describe herself
provided the likely consumers of her website with information that
was thus both factually accurate and directly relevant. For that
reason, the district court granted summary judgment
to Welles on
77
PEI's trademark infringement and dilution claims.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part. To resolve the issues, the panel turned to the nominative fair
use doctrine, crafted by Judge Kozinski in New Kids on the Block v.
New America Publishing, Inc.78 As a general principle, the
nominative fair use doctrine excuses, both for general trademark
infringement and dilution claims, 79 an unauthorized use of a

75.

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002).

76. Id. at 799.
77. Id. at 800. The district court also granted summary judgment of Playboy
Enterprises' breach of contract claims. In 1981, when Welles agreed to be Playmate of the
Year, her corporation, Pippi, Inc., signed a contract with Playboy Enterprises, in which
Pippi, Inc. agreed to obtain Playboy Enterprises' written approval before Welles made any
"non-Playboy use of her name with the designation 'Playmate of the Year."' Id. But Pippi,
Inc. was dissolved in 1984, and the district court held that the contract did not bind Welles
personally.
78.

971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).

79. Playboy Enters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 802-04, 805-06. The panel justified extending the
nominative fair use doctrine to dilution claims as follows:
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trademark where a defendant uses the trademark to refer back to
the trademark owner. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit will
evaluate whether the use is infringing or fair using a three-part
test:
First, the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only
so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the
user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
80
holder.
Applying the nominative fair use factors to Welles' website,
the Ninth Circuit held that her use of PEI's marks in her
masthead, banner advertisements, and metatags satisfied the
three requirements and were thus fair. As the Court noted, Welles
had "no practical way of describing herself without using [the
plaintiffs] trademarked terms."8 ' But the panel felt that Welles
went too far with her wallpaper. Welles' wallpaper, or background
of her website, used the abbreviation "PMOY '81" for "Playmate of
the Year 1981" repeatedly. In a somewhat curious, almost
hypertechnical application of the nominative fair use doctrine, the
panel held that because Welles' name or likeness did not appear
specifically in conjunction with each such abbreviation, Welles' use
of "PMOY '81"
failed the first element and was thus potentially
2
infringing.8
As a theoretical matter, the three-part nominative fair use test
is almost ideally tailored to balance effectively the competing
interests of the trademark owner, consumers, and competitors in
the potential information that a mark's use may convey. Ironically,
the precise tailoring of the test is the reason it does not work very
well in the real world. The test's application requires such a
factually intensive, and correspondingly expensive, process that
When Welles refers to her title, she is in effect referring to a product of PEI's. She
does not dilute the title by truthfully identifying herself as its one-time recipient any
more than Michael Jordan would dilute the name 'Chicago Bulls' by referring to
himself as a former member of that team, or the two-time winner of an Academy
Award would dilute the award by referring to him or herself as a 'two-time Academy
Award winner.' Awards are not diminished or diluted by the fact that they have been
awarded in the past. Similarly, they are not diminished or diluted when past
recipients truthfully identify themselves as such.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 806.
80. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308, quoted with approval in Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d at 801.
81. Playboy Enters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 803.
82. Id. at 804-05. The panel therefore remanded to the district court to determine
whether the protection of Playboy Enterprises' registered marks extended to the
abbreviation. Id. at 805.
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the expense of the process itself frustrates the system's efforts to
achieve justice. While the Welles' decision is certainly a step in the
right direction, it still leaves plaintiffs far too much leeway under
the factually intensive three-part inquiry to nitpick whether a
defendant, who has an admittedly legitimate interest in its use of
the plaintiffs trademark, has gone just a bit too far.8 3 A plaintiff
may argue, for example, that a defendant should have used a
slightly smaller or different colored-font, or placed the mark in a
different, less prominent location.
A far simpler rule that would nonetheless get the right answer
in the vast majority of cases would be the principle that the
Supreme Court articulated more than a century ago: Truth is not
trademark infringement.8 4 This approach would leave Welles free
to use the abbreviation "PMOY '81" in her wallpaper, but would
avoid the chilling consequences generated by the higher litigation
costs of a more factually intensive inquiry.
Nevertheless, if Welles was not as big a step as it could have
been, it was nonetheless a significant step in the right direction.
Soon thereafter, another step was taken in a case also involving
the unauthorized use of PEI's trademarks. In this second case,
Netscape was selling PEI's trademarks as keywords to competitors
so that when a user entered, for example, "playboy" as a search
term on Netscape's search engine, the engine would return both
the search results and competitors' banner advertisements
relevant to the user's search.8 5
Before reaching its final resolution, the case followed a
somewhat curious path. From consumers' perspective, the central
argument would be that Netscape's use, although unauthorized,

83. See Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) (noting that
"[c]ompetition is deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat
of successful suit ...").
84. See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 327 (1872). As
the Court itself explained:
It is only when the adoption or imitation of what is claimed to be a trade-mark
amounts to a false representation, express or implied, designed or incidental, that
there is any title to relief against it. True it may be that the use by a second producer,
in describing truthfully his product, of a name or a combination of words already in
use by another, may have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the origin or
ownership of the product, but if it is just as true in its application to his goods as it is
to those of another who first applied it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to
use it, there is no legal or moral wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but they
are not deceived by false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling
the truth.
Id.; see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("When the mark is used in
a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its
being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo.").
85.
2004).

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
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should be lawful because Netscape is simply offering consumers a
choice. If a consumer enters "playboy" or "playmate" as a search
term, then the search results will identify where to find PEI's
products and the banner advertisements simply offer alternative
sources for similar products. Rather than focus on this issue,
however, the district court denied PEI's motion for preliminary
injunction primarily on the grounds that PEI failed to show that
Netscape had used the terms in their trademark rather than their
generic sense.8 6 As a factual proposition, it is nonsense to think
that parents were using the term "playmate" on Netscape's search
engine in its generic sense, hoping to set up play dates for their
kids, or that cigar-smoking, scotch-drinking, well-heeled
gentlemen who travel in private jets were using the term
"playboy," hoping to catch up on the latest trends among their
social peers. Netscape's clients that were purchasing PEI's
trademarks as keywords were all porn sites. Thus, the whole idea
behind Netscape's sale of these terms as keywords was that users
were looking for PEI, or PEI-like, products, and were thus using
the terms in their trademark, rather than generic, sense.
Nonetheless, when PEI appealed, a panel of the Ninth Circuit,
consisting of Judges Wallace, Ferris, and T.G. Nelson, affirmed the
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction.8 7 So emboldened,
on remand, the district court granted Netscape summary judgment
on essentially those same grounds. However, this time on appeal,
Judges Fletcher and Berzon replaced Judges Wallace and Ferris,
88
and the panel reversed.
In an opinion written by Judge T.G. Nelson, who was on both
panels, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of PEI's marks was
plainly in their trademark, rather than generic sense. The central
issue was therefore whether Netscape's use created a likelihood of
confusion. On this issue, as well as the claim for dilution, the
Ninth Circuit held that there were genuine issues of material fact
89
and remanded for trial.
In thinking about whether Netscape's actions should
constitute infringement, the key is whether trademark law is
intended to protect trademark owners or consumers. From the
trademark owner's perspective, any unauthorized use of their
mark that leads to sales for someone else should constitute
infringement. The Brookfield panel's vision of initial interest
confusion seemingly embraced this perspective when it justified

86. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal),
affd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
87.

202 F.3d 278 (9th 1999) (unpublished opinion).

88. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
89. Id. at 1031, 1034.
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rendering momentary consumer confusion as actionable because it
constituted "a misappropriation of Brookfield's goodwill." 90 From a
consumer's perspective, the issue is not so simple. For the
consumer, if the so-called "confusion" simply makes the consumer
aware of another choice, and the confusion lasts only momentarily,
in the sense that there is no significant reliance or sunk cost
generated by the initially misleading impression, then the
consumer's decision to purchase from the newly-recognized
competitor is simply a choice. Like other choices, it presumably
reflects the consumer's decision as to how best to maximize her
own welfare, given the resources and information available. Even
if the decision means a lost sale to a particular trademark owner,
it is hard to see how such a decision harms the consumer. In fact,
the consumer's decision to go through with the purchase probably
demonstrates, in the only way that really matters, where her best
interests lie. Thus, from the consumer's perspective, initial interest
confusion should probably not be actionable as a general matter,
and certainly not when it is clear from the outset that the
consumer is simply being offered a choice, even if the trigger for
that offering is someone else's trademark.
As between these two perspectives, the Playboy v. Netscape
opinion began on a troubling note by acknowledging that "PEI's
theory [of infringement] strongly resembles the [initial interest
confusion] theory adopted by this court in Brookfield
Communications, Inc."9 1 The Playboy v. Netscape court did not
follow through, however, on Brookfield's trademark owner-centric
vision of trademark law, but instead, in at least two respects, tried
to re-align the initial interest confusion doctrine with a more
consumer-centric perspective. First, rather than treat initial
interest confusion as a stand-alone doctrine, the Playboy v.
Netscape court insisted on evaluating the likelihood of confusion
through its traditional, eight-factor likelihood of confusion
analysis. 92 By doing so, the Playboy v. Netscape court provided a

90. As the Brookfield panel explained:
And even where people realize, immediately upon accessing "moviebuff.com," that
they have reached a site operated by West Coast and wholly unrelated to Brookfield,
West Coast will still have gained a customer by appropriating the goodwill that
Brookfield has developed in its 'MovieBuff' mark. A consumer who was originally
looking for Brookfield's products or services may be perfectly content with West
Coast's database (especially as it is offered free of charge); but he reached West
Coast's site because of its use of Brookfield's mark as its second-level domain name,
which is a misappropriation of Brookfield's goodwill by West Coast.
Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. West Coast Enterm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
91.

Id. at 1025.

92. Id. at 1026 ("Although analogies to Brookfield suggest that PEI will be able to show
a likelihood of confusion sufficient to defeat summary judgment, we must test PEI's theory
using this circuit's well-established eight-factor test for the likelihood of confusion to be
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more thorough framework in which to evaluate the nature and
extent of any confusion that may arise. Second, while the court did
not expressly require proof that the confusion be material, the
court did acknowledge the need to leave competitors room to use
one another's trademarks without authorization by specifically
stating what it was not addressing:
[W]e note that we are not addressing a situation in which a
banner advertisement clearly identifies its source with its
sponsor's name, or in which a search engine clearly identifies
a banner advertisement's source. We are also not addressing a
situation in which advertisers or defendants overtly compare
PEI's products to a competitor's-saying, for example "if you
are interested in Playboy, you may also be interested in the
following message from [a different, named company]."
Rather, we are evaluating a situation in which defendants
display competitors' unlabeled banner advertisements, with no
label or overt comparison to PEI, after Internet users type in
93
PEI's trademarks.
In her concurrence, Judge Berzon went a bit further, by
questioning the initial interest confusion doctrine generally and reemphasizing the limited nature of the court's holding:
As applied to this case, Brookfield might suggest that there
could be a Lanham Act violation even if the banner
advertisements were clearly labeled, either by the advertiser
or by the search engine. I do not believe that to be so. So read,
the metatag holding in Brookfield would expand the reach of
initial interest confusion from situations in which a party is
initially confused to situations in which a party is never
confused. I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest
confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or
affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset
that a product or web link is not related to that of the
trademark holder because the list produced by the search
engine so informs him.

certain."). In the Ninth Circuit, the eight factors are: (1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2)
proximity of the parties' goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised
by consumers in purchasing the goods; (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and
(8) where the plaintiff and defendant's products are not directly competing, the likelihood
that the plaintiff will expand its product lines into the defendant's markets. See, e.g.,
Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1026. All of the circuits follow similar, multi-factor
approaches to the likelihood of confusion issue, and all of the approaches are derived from
Judge Friendly's initial summary of the relevant factors in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
93. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 354 F.3d at 1029.

Vol. 97 TMR

959

There is a big difference between hijacking a customer to
another website by making the customer think he or she is
visiting the trademark holder's website (even if only briefly),
which is what may be happening in this case when the banner
advertisements are not labeled, and just distracting a
potential customer with another choice, when it is clear that it
is a choice. True, when the search engine list generated by the
search for the trademark ensconced in a metatag comes up, an
internet user might choose to visit westcoastvideo.com, the
defendant's website in Brookfield, instead of the plaintiffs
moviebuff.com website, but such choices do not constitute
trademark infringement off the internet, and I cannot
understand why they should on the internet. 94
Although the seeming acknowledgement by both the majority
and the concurrence that initial interest confusion might be
actionable, even in the absence of sunk costs or materiality more
generally, is troubling-though perhaps inevitable given stare
decisis, the suggestion that initial interest confusion might be just
one more factor in the court's eight-factor likelihood of confusion
inquiry is certainly encouraging. If initial interest confusion is
simply one more factor to consider, then its presence alone would
not justify a conclusion of infringement where a careful review of
the other factors weighs against such a conclusion. 95 Similarly, the
express acknowledgement that competitors may legitimately use
another's trademark without authorization on the Internet, just as
they may in the real world, should also help place limits on the
seemingly unlimited reach of Brookfield's version of the initial
interest confusion doctrine.
Together, these two decisions took significant steps towards
restoring balance, and a more consumer-centric viewpoint, to
trademark law as it applies to the Internet. More work remained
to be done, however, with respect to gripe sites and keyword
advertisements, which the following two sections address in turn.
B. Using Another's Trademark to Complain
(or Talk) About Them
In the Internet's frontier era, courts had seemingly answered
whether someone other than the trademark owner could own the
corresponding domain name in order to set up a site criticizing or

94. Id. at 1034-35 (Berzon, J., concurring).
95. For an application of such an approach, see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment of noninfringement and holding
that "the [trial) court's refusal to enter the 'initial interest' thicket is well taken given the
unlikelihood of 'legally significant' confusion" based upon the eight-factor test); see also text
accompanying notes 131-39, infra.
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complaining about the trademark owner. While courts left room for
domain names along the lines of www.trademarksucks.com, 96 they
had repeatedly found trademark infringement or dilution when a
complaint site used www.trademark.com as its address, as the
PETA, Jews for Jesus, and Planned Parenthood decisions reflect.
Once the frontier era ended, however,
courts proved willing to
97
revisit this seemingly resolved issue.
98
For example, in Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer,
Kremer was dissatisfied with the hair restoration services he
received from Bosley Medical. So Kremer purchased the domain
names www.bosleymedical.com and www.bosleymedicalviolations.com.
On www.bosleymedical.com, he posted a summary of the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's 1996 investigative findings
about Bosley and other information highly critical of Bosley. 99
Displeased with this use of its trade name and service mark,
Bosley Medical sued alleging trademark infringement, dilution,
and a violation of the ACPA. Although Kremer was not selling any
goods or services at his site, frontier-era cases, such as PETA, Jews
for Jesus, and Planned Parenthood,seemed to have foreclosed any
quick exit for Kremer on that basis. Nevertheless, the district
court granted Kremer summary judgment, holding that there was
no evidence that Kremer's use of the domain name was in
commerce. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary
judgment on the trademark infringement and dilution claims, but
on slightly different grounds. The Ninth Circuit explained that the
"use in commerce" language in Section 1114(a) was simply
jurisdictional-a requirement that defendant's conduct be within
the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 10 0 On that
issue, Kremer's conduct was certainly sufficient to bring him
within Congress's power to regulate.
Instead of focusing on the "use in commerce" language, the
Ninth Circuit wrote that the district court should have focused on
the language requiring the use to be "in connection with the sale of
goods or services."'' 1 That language tied the infringement standard
to its purpose of preventing company A from using company B's

96. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that defendant's use of domain name www.ballysucks.com constituted
neither trademark infringement nor dilution).
97. See also Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no likelihood
of confusion where defendant maintained site critical of plaintiffs business and included
plaintiffs name and the name of her business in the site's metatags).
98. 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
99. Id. at 675.
100.

Id. at 677.

101.

Id.
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trademark to pass off its own goods as those of company B.10 2
Because Kremer did not sell any goods or services, and did not
directly link to any sites that did so, his use did not create any
such likelihood of confusion, and was thus not in connection with
the sale of any goods or services.
The Ninth Circuit refused to follow PETA and the other early
cases that held that a use is sufficiently commercial if the
unauthorized website may interfere with a consumer's ability to
find the real website. 103 As the Ninth Circuit explained:
Kremer is not Bosley's competitor; he is their critic .... The
dangers that the Lanham Act was designed to address are
simply not at issue in this case. The Lanham Act, expressly
enacted to be applied in commercial contexts, does not prohibit
all unauthorized uses of a trademark. Kremer's use of the
Bosley Medical mark simply cannot mislead consumers into
buying a competing product-no customer will mistakenly
purchase a hair replacement service from Kremer under the
belief that the service is being offered by Bosley. Neither is
Kremer capitalizing on the good will Bosley has created in its
mark. Any harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor's sale
of a similar product under Bosley's mark, but from Kremer's
criticism of their services. Bosley cannot use the Lanham Act
either as a shield from Kremer's criticism, or as a sword to
04
shut Kremer up.
While the Ninth Circuit's approach correctly exonerated
Kremer, it is troublesome that the court relied on the "in
connection with the sale ... of any goods or services" requirement.
Presumably, the panel relied on this element, rather than using a
likelihood of confusion analysis, because Kremer's use of Bosley's
trademark as his domain name would create initial interest
confusion under Brookfield. However, relying on the "in connection
with the sale" language creates a conflict with the Fourth Circuit's
PETA decision, and generates considerable uncertainty for parties
trying to understand what the rules are for gripe sites on the
Internet.
Three additional aspects of the court's approach are troubling.
First, the infringement standard for unregistered trademarks in

102. Id. ("As the Second Circuit held, 'the Lanham Act seeks to prevent
consumer confusion that enables a seller to pass off his goods as the goods of another....
Trademark infringement protects only against mistaken purchasing decisions and not
against confusion generally."').
103. Id. at 679 ('CTo the extent that the PETA court held that the Lanham Act's
commercial use requirement is satisfied because the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark
as the domain name may deter customers from reaching the plaintiffs site itself, we
respectfully disagree with that rationale.").
104. Id. at 679-80.
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Section 43(a) does not contain the "in connection with the sale...
of any goods or services" language, but is phrased more broadly in
terms of "in connection with any goods or services."'10 5 Because
Section 43(a) does not require that the use be in connection with
the sale of any goods or services, presumably the fact that Kremer
is not selling anything is immaterial to liability. Even if not in
connection with a sale, Kremer's criticism focuses on Bosley's
services specifically and would thus seem to fall within the scope of
Section 43(a). This difference in phrasing between the
infringement standards for registered and unregistered marks
raises doubts as to whether Congress intended the "sale" language
to play such a crucial role in defining the scope of infringement.
Giving the "sale" language such a crucial role would lead to
broader protection for unregistered marks than for registered
marks, which presumably is not what Congress intended.
Second, relying on the "in connection with the sale" language
also means that Kremer's use would have been actionable had
Kremer had any advertising on his site, or had he linked more
directly to commercial sites. 106 But from a consumer's perspective,
it would make little sense to distinguish the liability of two sites,
both criticizing a trademark owner in similar ways, on the basis of
some incidental advertising or linking. Presumably, these sites are
permissible because the value of the information they provide
consumers regarding the trademark owner outweighs any
incidental risk that such a site will mislead a consumer into
buying a product from company A believing it comes from company
B. We can get at that balancing directly through a sensible
likelihood of confusion analysis-indeed, that is precisely the sort
of role that the likelihood of confusion element is supposed to play.
The commercial use element, on the other hand, is not tailored to
that sort of balancing at all. Instead, it decides the issue solely by
asking whether the speaker is paying the costs of the criticism
entirely out of her own pocket.
Third, using an artificial formality, like the commercial use
element, to dodge the excesses of the initial interest confusion
doctrine reduces pressure on, and avoids an opportunity to, rein in
that doctrine's excesses. Other circuits have quite sensibly refused
to tip-toe around Brookfield. In Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 10 7 for
example, when a web designer learned of plans to build a shopping
mall called The Shops at Willow Bend in Plano, Texas, he
registered the domain name shopsatwillowbend.com and set up a
site with information about the project. When the mall's builder

105.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2007).

106. Bosley Medical Institute, Inc., 403 F.3d at 677-78.
107. 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
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learned of the site, the builder demanded that web designer
remove the site. When he would not, the builder filed suit alleging
trademark infringement of its registered trademark THE SHOPS
AT WILLOW BEND. 10 8 Although the Sixth Circuit indicated that
the use might not be commercial, 10 9 the Sixth Circuit also held that
the builder was unlikely to succeed on the merits because there
was no likelihood of confusion. In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the web designer maintained a "conspicuous
disclaimer" on the website and a link to the mall's official
website."1 0 As a result, "a misplaced customer simply has to click
his mouse to be redirected to [the mall's official] site." ' Moreover,
the court specifically held that confusion as to the source of the
website was not sufficient; the builder had to show a likelihood of
consumer confusion with respect to the goods or services offered on
11 2
the defendant's website.
While Bosley Medical and Taubman approach the issue
differently, both cases illustrate a greater willingness by courts to
tolerate a website using as its domain name another's trademark
when the site's purpose is to criticize, or provide information
about, the products or services of the trademark owner. The trick
is to find a way to permit such sites, given that the frontier-era
judicial decisions seemingly forbid such sites directly, as in PETA,
or indirectly, under the broad reach of Brookfield's initial interest
confusion doctrine. So far, courts have been able to do so either by
distinguishing early cases, or where the courts are in another
circuit, by refusing to follow them. Nevertheless, because most of
the frontier-era cases have not been expressly overturned and
therefore remain formally on the books, this approach makes it
difficult to predict with certainty whether a court in any given case
will follow the frontier-era cases or embrace the more recent trend.
Also unclear is whether a court will focus on the commercial use
formality or the likelihood of confusion analysis as the central
issue in resolving such cases. A similar story can be told about the
judicial treatment of the unauthorized use of another's trademark
in keyword advertising, as the next section demonstrates.

108. 319 F.3d at 772.
109. Id. (noting that website initially contained link to defendant's web design business
and his girlfriend's t-shirt design business, but that these were removed after the litigation
was filed).
110. Id. at 776-77.
111. Id. at 777.
112. Id. at 776 ("Under Lanham Act jurisprudence, it is irrelevant whether customers
would be confused as to the origin of the websites, unless there is confusion as to the origin
of the respective products.").
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C. Using Another's Trademark to Sell My Goods:
Comparative Advertising or Confusion?

Having lost in the Ninth Circuit on the issue of keyword
advertising in Playboy v. Netscape, search engines and others with
a commercial interest in such advertising took their arguments to
the other circuits. As cases arose, proponents of keyword
advertising argued: (i) that the use of a trademark to trigger the
display of advertisements, websites in new windows, or additional
search results did not constitute "use" sufficient to trigger
trademark liability; and (ii) that their keyword ads did not create
actionable confusion in any event.
With respect to the use issue, their argument was simple. The
plain language of the Trademark Act requires "use" for trademark
infringement under Sections 1114(a) for registered marks and
1125(a)(1) for unregistered marks, and also requires "use" for
dilution liability under Section 1125(c). The proponents of keyword
advertising then turned to Section 1127 of the Trademark Act to
' 1 13
define use as "plac[ing the mark] in any manner on the goods.'
To this line of statutory argument, they added the common law's
distinction between internal and external uses of a mark, reflected
in cases such as Blue Bell, Inc. v.FarahMfg. Co.14 On this basis,
they argued that a company's purely internal use of a mark, such
as in the software coding of a search engine, to cause the display of
an advertisement does not constitute trademark use. 115 Although
seemingly straightforward, these arguments ignore the context in
which the statutory definition of, and common law rules
concerning, use arose.

113. Section 45 of the Trademark Act has the following definition of use:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course
of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this Act, a
mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed inthe sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2007).
114.

508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).

115. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc., 508 F.2d at 1265-66 (holding that intra-corporate
shipments of marked goods, even if denominated "sales" for accounting purposes,
insufficient to establish use in a priority dispute).
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When Congress redefined use in 1988, as "the bona fide use of
a mark in the course of trade,"'116 it did so specifically to overrule
the judicially created, token use doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
Patent and Trademark Office had allowed the registration of a
mark based upon a single, token shipment of the goods across state
lines, even where the shipment was not part of any bone fide
commercial transaction. 11 7 After Congress amended the use
definition in 1988, trademark registration, as well as common law
rights based upon use, would both require bona fide commercial
use." 8 Congress's decision to eliminate the token use doctrine
reflected a focus on what it took to acquire trademark rights, not
what it took to infringe them. Moreover, Congress was not
thinking of the keyword advertising issue, as that issue would not
arise for fifteen years.
Similarly, the judicial distinction between internal and
external uses of a trademark arose not in defining the scope of
infringement specifically, but in priority disputes. These priority
disputes involved competing claims to a trademark based upon two
parties who began using the same mark, or confusingly similar
marks, at about the same time. For unregistered, inherently
distinctive marks, priority, and ownership of the mark, went to the
party who used it first. But to qualify, a use could not be purely
internal, within a corporation; it had to be part of an interaction
with consumers that offered consumers a chance to begin
associating the mark with specific goods coming from a specific
source. 1 9 Like the statutory definition of use, the external-internal
use distinction was thus directed at what it took to acquire
trademark rights, not what it took to infringe them.
Despite the acquisition rather than infringement origins of the
statutory definition of use and the internal-external use
distinction, proponents of keyword advertising managed to
persuade the Second Circuit and a handful of district courts that
using another's trademark to trigger the display of an
advertisement for a competitor does not constitute trademark use
at all. 120 In these cases, the courts reasoned that, because

116. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 667, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 134, 102
Stat. 3935, 3948.
117. See, e.g., Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (2001); Allard
Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 1998).
118. See, e.g., Allard Enters., Inc., 146 F.3d at 357 (noting that the amendments brought
the legal standard for the "use" required for registration in line with the use required for
common law priority).
119. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1975).
120. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408-12 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005); Rescue.com Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393
(N.D.N.Y. 2006); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415-16
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consumers will not typically see the software code that triggers the
advertising display, the use of another's trademark in that
software was internal, 121 a "pure machine-linking function."'122 In
addition, as the courts also noted, such keyword advertising does
not expressly place the plaintiffs trademark "on the goods or
containers" of the defendant's goods, as is seemingly required by
23
the statutory definition of use.1
Other courts, following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in
Playboy v. Netscape, have disagreed, holding that the use of
another's trademarks to trigger advertisements may constitute use
for purposes of trademark infringement. 24 As between these two
approaches, the author believes that the courts that have found
"use" have the better of the argument for three reasons.
First, the "it's not a use" approach leads to some artificial
distinctions. In the Second Circuit's 1-800 Contacts opinion, for
example, the court distinguished Playboy v. Netscape on the
ground that Netscape had been selling specific trademarks as
keywords. In contrast, WhenU's software in the 1-800 Contacts
case triggered pop-up advertisements based upon categories or
bundles of words, some of which were trademarks and some of
which were not. 125 The 1-800 Contacts court even noted that
WhenU did not disclose to its clients what words or marks
comprise the various categories, 126 as if we are supposed to believe
that these clients would buy a pig in a poke. The 1-800 Contacts
court also argued that the WhenU's software was based not on
trademarks, but on website addresses. It is just happenstance we
are told that the plaintiffs trademark and website address are the

(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich.
2003); U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
121. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409 ("A company's internal utilization of a
trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public is analogous to a individual's
private thoughts about a trademark. Such conduct simply does not violate the Lanham Act
....
");Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 ('CThis internal use of the mark 'Zocor' as a key
word to trigger the display of sponsored links is not use of the mark in a trademark sense.")
122.

U-Haul International,Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.

123.

See Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415.

124. See J. G. Wentworth, SSC Limited Partnership v. Settlement Funding LLC, Civ.
No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); Buying for the Home, LLC
v. Humble Abode, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76371 (D.N.J. 2006); 800-JR Cigar, Inc., v.
Goto.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (D.N.J. 2006); Edina Realty, Inc. v. The
MLSOnline.com, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 (D. Minn. 2006); Google v. American Blind &
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Government
Employees Insurance Corp. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 (E. D. Va. 2004).
125. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409 ("In contrast to some of its competitors,
moreover, WhenU does not disclose the proprietary contents of the SaveNow directory to its
advertising clients nor does it permit these clients to request or purchase specified keywords
to add to the directory.").
126. Id.
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same, except for the addition of "www." at the front and ".com" at
the end. 127 Just as it was critical for the district court in Playboy v.
Netscape that we somehow could not tell whether a consumer
meant "playboy" or PLAYBOY when it entered the term in a
search engine, so for the Second Circuit, the fact that WhenU's
software uses "www.trademark.com" instead of just "trademark" in
its software coding proved a critical distinction.128
Yet, these "it's not a use" courts never explain why any of
these technical distinctions would matter to a consumer. The
consumer types in a given web address into a search engine and
instead of finding one website, now finds two, three, or perhaps
more in different windows. A consumer may be confused by this
array of options or not-that is a separate question. However, for
those consumers who are and remain confused, it does not matter
whether the software generated the options from individual
trademarks or categories of words, nor does it matter whether the
software generated the options from the use of domain names
containing trademarks or the trademarks themselves. These
distinctions are artificial because they bear no relation to the
Trademark Act's policies reflected in the ultimate question: How
likely are the defendant's actions to lead a consumer to purchase
goods or services from company A believing they come from
company B?
Second, in these cases, the defendant has used the mark. A
consumer has typed the words in, and the defendant (or its
software) has responded to that communication. That's a use, and
because it is part of an interaction with a consumer, it is not
merely an internal one. Consider a corresponding example from
the brick-and-mortar world: a customer walks into a bar or
restaurant and orders a Coke. Without ever saying a word, the bar
tender or waiter serves the customer a Pepsi. That is undoubtedly
a classic example of passing off and, so long as Coke is a
trademark, constitutes trademark infringement. Yet, under the
Second Circuit's approach in 1-800 Contacts, so long as the
bartender or waiter never spoke (or otherwise displayed) the word
"Coke," there could be no trademark or unfair competition liability.
Such a conclusion makes no sense, however. The customer
ordered using the word "Coke" and the business responded to it.
We use language not only when we speak words, but when we hear

127. Id. at 408-09.
128. Id. ("The district court found that the differences between 1-800's trademarks and
the website address utilized by WhenU were insignificant because they were limited to the
addition of the 'www.' and '.com' and the omission of the hyphen and a space. We conclude
that, to the contrary, the differences between the marks are quite significant because they
transform 1-800's trademark-which is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act-into a
word combination that functions more or less like a public key to 1-800's website.").
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them and respond to them. Under both the statute and the
common law, the bar or restaurant's response to the customer's
statement constitutes a use sufficient to establish liability. The
Ninth Circuit took this view in Playboy v. Netscape. Although
Netscape did not expressly attach the word "Playboy" or any of
PEI's other trademarks to the infringing banner advertisements, it
displayed those advertisements specifically in response to a user's
entry of one of PEI's trademarks. Because the consumer had typed
in "playboy" and received certain ads in reply, from the consumer's
perspective, the banners were implicitly labeled with PEI's
trademarks, just as the customer's drink was implicitly labeled
"Coke."1 29
Third, and perhaps most important, relying on a narrow
definition of use to knock-out these claims, will knock-out these
claims for all sorts of keyword advertisements, including ads that
create classic confusion as to source. Because the "use" formality
does not directly incorporate a consideration of the information
being conveyed, or attempt to separate and balance the confusing
and the useful aspects of that information, we cannot use it to sort
the sheep from the goats on competitors' unauthorized uses of a
mark very effectively. Only where we can be certain that a
particular category or class of behavior will generate almost no
possibility of confusion under any circumstances should we turn to
an all-or-nothing formality, such as use, to exclude that class from
potential liability under the statute. Perhaps, certain gripe sites
that neither sell any goods or services, nor advertise any goods or
services, may constitute such a category, but based upon my own
experience with keyword advertising, pop-ups and other forms of
keyword advertising do not. Some keyword ads are quite
confusing, and not just momentarily. Moreover, even if they were
non-confusing as a class today, if we declare keyword advertising
as per se noninfringing, then we should expect them to become
more confusing as the threat of a trademark suit recedes.
Of course, many of these keyword advertising schemes are
quite helpful to consumers, providing them with more, and more
accurate, information to match their desires to specific products in
the marketplace. The author therefore sympathizes with the
efforts of the Second Circuit in the 1-800 Contacts case to
legitimize this conduct. 130 The overly broad reach of the initial

129. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir.
2004) ('Defendants argue that dilution cannot be found because they do not label their own
goods with PEI's marks. However, when one considers things from the consumers'
perspective, defendants' argument fails. According to PEI's evidence, in the minds of
consumers, defendants implicitly label the goods of PEI's competitors with its marks.").
130. At the same time, the author finds the specific program at issue in that case, the
SaveNow program, to represent a particularly, undesirable form of ad ware.
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interest confusion doctrine also creates a temptation to adopt an
overly narrow interpretation of the use element as a prophylactic,
to avoid a likelihood of confusion inquiry that has gotten out of
control. But fighting one wrong rule with another rule, equally
wrong but in the opposite direction, and hoping that the two
wrongs balance out and somehow make a right, is no way to run a
legal system.
From the author's perspective, the better approach, and the
one more consistent with a consumer-centric view of trademarks,
is to follow the path suggested by Judge Berzon in her concurrence
in Playboy v. Netscape and look realistically at the different
information the triggered ads convey to the average consumer.
Such an approach would enable us to balance directly the nature
and extent of any illegitimate informational role, such as an
express statement or implicit suggestion that the goods of company
A come from company B, against the legitimate informational role
of offering consumers competitive alternatives.
Several district courts already have begun to blaze this trail.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.,13 1 for
example, the district court found that Google's program of selling
specific trademarks as keywords to trigger the display of
advertisements constituted trademark use. 132 The district court
also recognized that the creation of initial interest confusion
constituted actionable trademark infringement. 133 Nonetheless,
the district court held that merely because initial interest
confusion could happen did not establish that it had happened, and
the court therefore proceeded to examine, as the Ninth Circuit had
in Playboy v. Netscape, GEICO's survey and other evidence offered
to prove a likelihood of confusion. After reviewing the evidence, the
district court granted Google summary judgment on the sale of
GEICO's trademarks as keywords, holding as a matter of law, that
GEICO had presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion as to the sale of the trademarks as
keywords.13 4 But the district court set for trial the issue of whether
sponsored links that contained the GEICO trademarks in their
headings or text created a likelihood of confusion.13 5 While one may
quibble with the district court's results, the judge at least tried to
balance the consumer's interest in avoiding confusion against the
consumer's interest in obtaining additional information in
131. Government Employees Ins. Corp. v. Google, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, 77
U.S.P.Q,2d 1841 (E.D. Va. 2005) (hereinafter GEICO II); Government Employees Ins. Corp.
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 (E.D. Va. 2004) (hereinafter GEICO 1).
132.

GEICO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04.

133.

GEICOII, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *14-16.

134.

Id. at *25.

135.

Id. at *25-26.
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determining which, if any, of the defendant's uses trademark law
should prohibit.
Similarly, in J.G. Wentworth, SSC Limited Partnership v.
Settlement Funding LLC, 136 another district court found that
Google's sale of trademarks as advertising keywords constituted
137
use and also recognized initial interest confusion as actionable.
Nonetheless, the district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, holding that no likelihood of confusion existed. In
reaching its decision, the court disagreed with the Brookfield
court's suggestion that the use of another's trademark in a
metatag or as a keyword to trigger the display of sponsored links
will necessarily mislead consumers. Such uses will cause "a link to
defendant's website [to] appear[] on the search results page as one
138
of many choices for the potential consumer to investigate."'
However, because "the links to defendant's website always appear
as independent and distinct links on the search result pages ...
potential consumers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's
services, goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of
plaintiff."'139 Again, while one may quibble with the district court's
precise conclusion, its approach, focusing on the legitimate
informational role of offering consumers additional choices and the
illegitimate role of potentially confusing consumers as to whom
they are buying from, is the right one.
As these two decisions illustrate, it is possible to tame the
initial interest confusion beast. More important, it is possible to
tame the beast in a way that aligns trademark law more closely
with the consumer interest it is supposed to serve.
IV. A BRIEF GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE
Hopefully the future path of trademark law on the Internet
has been laid out over the last five years. There can be little doubt
that the first five years were rough. In its frontier era, courts
responded to the seeming lawlessness of the Internet by rewriting
trademark law to catch the bad actors who were using others'
trademarks without any legitimate excuse. As this period drew to
a close, the Brookfield court's adoption of a radically overbroad
initial interest confusion doctrine put an exclamation point on this
era's dominant theme: bad facts (and sometimes, not so bad facts)
made bad law.

136. Civ. No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).
137. J. G. Wentworth, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *16-17, 19-21.
138. Id. at *22-23.
139. Id. at *23-24.
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Over the last five years, courts have made a striking aboutface in applying trademark law to the Internet. From a knee-jerk
protectiveness of the trademark owner's desire to maximize its
profits, hidden behind ambiguous and ultimately meaningless
phrases such as "misappropriating [the trademark owner's] good
will,"'140 courts have moved toward a more rational balancing of the
varying informational roles that an unauthorized use of another's
trademark can serve. While there is still some way to go, the last
five years have seen a sharp turn from a property-based or
trademark owner-centric view of trademarks, which dominated the
first five years, towards a deception-based or consumer-centric
view of trademarks.
From a consumer-centric perspective, the unauthorized use of
another's trademark can serve illegitimate informational roles, by
expressly stating or implicitly suggesting that company B is the
source of goods or services that are really provided by company A.
But they can also play legitimate informational roles, by helping
consumers find information on competitive alternatives or a thirdparty's view of the trademark owner's goods or services. If the
unauthorized use of another's trademark leads to a lost sale for the
trademark owner through one of these legitimate informational
roles, then that should not constitute trademark infringement.
Even if it might fall within the arguable scope of ambiguous
phrases, such as "free riding" or "appropriating the trademark
owner's goodwill,"' 4' whatever those phrases mean, criticism and
competition are not confusion. Even if achieving effective
competition or criticism entails some incidental confusion,
consumers will tolerate confusion so long as the benefits they
receive from the competition and legitimate information they
receive in return outweighs the cost of the confusion.
Yet, even if the recent trend in applying trademark law to the
Internet is encouraging, the tension between the property-based
and deception-based visions of trademark law is not new and is not
unique to the Internet. Nearly 40 years ago, the Ninth Circuit
recognized this tension between what's good for consumers and
what's good for the trademark owner in approving the use of a
competitor's trademark in comparative advertising:
Disapproval of the copyist's opportunism may be an
understandable first reaction, "but this initial response to the
problem has been curbed in deference to the greater public

140. Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. West Coast Enterm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999).
141. Id. at 1062 (making initial interest confusion, even where consumer is never
confused, if a defendant uses the plaintiffs trademark to get the consumer to consider the
defendant's goods or services because such use "improperly benefits from the goodwill that
[the plaintiff] developed in its mark").
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good." By taking his "free ride," the copyist, albeit
unintentionally, serves an important public interest by
offering comparable goods at lower prices. On the other hand,
the trademark owner, perhaps equally without design,
sacrifices public to personal 142
interests by seeking immunity
from the rigors of competition.
Over the history of trademark law, sometimes courts are able to
curb their instinctive disapproval of the "copyist's opportunism," of
free riding, of reaping where another has sown, or whatever other
conclusory and pejorative label a judge may attach, for the sake of
the more effective competition and increased consumer welfare it
brings. In these times, trademark law moves towards a more
consumer-centric perspective. Other times, courts seem unable to
get past their initial reaction and push trademark law towards a
more trademark owner-centric perspective. As just one example of
such cycling, consider that every 30 years or so, the Supreme Court
has felt the need to step in and limit (or re-limit) the scope of trade
43
dress protection.
Right now, the recent trend towards a more consumer-centric
application of trademark law to the Internet is encouraging. But
the author is enough of a realist to recognize that this trend will
not last. Sooner or later, judges will once again start giving in to
their instinctive dislike of the "copyist's opportunism," and the
pendulum will start to swing back towards a more trademark
owner-centric vision of trademark law. One can only hope that we
have some time before that begins to happen, and that before it
does, the courts will firmly install some sensible, and consumercentric, doctrines that can prove effective bulwarks against the
next property-based turn.
Such consumer-centric doctrines would include a clear
recognition that: (i) truth is not trademark infringement; (ii) only
confusion likely to influence consumer purchasing decisions
materially is actionable; and (iii) even conduct that causes
material confusion is not actionable where the harm it causes
consumers is outweighed by offsetting benefits that the conduct
generates, whether in the form of more effective competition or an
expanded information set for consumer decision-making. Over the

142. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1968).
143. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (reestablishing the functionality limitation on trade dress protection); Wal-Mart Stores v.
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (re-requiring proof of secondary meaning for the
protection of product design trade dress); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) (using preemption to limit sharply the protection of product designs under the rubric
of state unfair competition law); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964) (same); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (reversing appeals
court's decision prohibiting Kellogg from selling shredded wheat cereal in a pillow-shaped
form).
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last five years, courts have taken significant steps towards
recognizing each of these consumer-centric principles in applying
trademark law to the Internet. Just a little further, and then it
will be a matter of holding the line as the tide begins to turn once
again.

